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RESUMEN 
Farmer (1991) sugiere que en un modelo en el que hay multiplicidad de 
equilibrios con expectativas racionales (ER) los agentes pueden encontrar 
œtil coordinar sus expectativas en un œnico equilibrio de ER que sea inmune 
a la Cr￿tica de Lucas. En este art￿culo, evaluamos la robustez de un 
equilibrio a prueba de la Cr￿tica de Lucas (PL) con un modelo con estructura 
temporal de tipos de interØs utilizando datos americanos de la posguerra 
mundial. Los resultados de la estimaci￿n muestran que el equilibrio PL 
presenta caracter￿sticas importantes de los datos que no son reproducibles 
por un equilibrio fundamental. Por ejemplo, los tipos a corto se comportan 
como un paseo aleatorio en un rØgimen caracterizado por una baja 
volatilidad condicional, en tanto que  el diferencial de tipos causa en el 
sentido de Granger los tipos a corto en per￿odos caracterizados por alta 
volatilidad. 




Farmer (1991) suggests that in a model in which there are multiple rational 
expectations (RE) equilibria agents may find it useful to coordinate their 
expectations in a unique RE equilibrium which is immune to the Lucas 
Critique. In this paper, we evaluate Lucas proof (LP) equilibrium 
performance in the context of the term structure of interest rates model by 
using post-war US data. Estimation results show that the LP equilibrium 
exhibits some important features of the data that are not reproduced by the 
fundamental equilibrium. For instance, the short rate behaves as a random 
walk in a regime characterized by low conditional volatility, whereas the 
term spread Granger-causes changes in the short-rate in periods 
characterized by high conditional volatility. 
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Abstract
Farmer (1991) suggests that in a model in which there are multiple
rational expectations (RE) equilibria agents may ﬁnd it useful to
coordinate their expectations in a unique RE equilibrium which is
immune to the Lucas Critique. In this paper, we evaluate Lucas proof
(LP) equilibrium performance in the context of the term structure of
interest rates model by using post-war US data. Estimation results
show that the LP equilibrium exhibits some important features of
the data that are not reproduced by the fundamental equilibrium.
For instance, the short rate behaves as a random walk in a regime
characterized by low conditional volatility, whereas the term spread
Granger-causes changes in the short-rate in periods characterized by
high conditional volatility.
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11I N T R O D U C T I O N
Farmer (1991) proposes immunity to the Lucas Critique (Lucas, 1976) as
a selection criterion in models with multiple rational expectations (RE)
equilibria. The idea underlying his paper is that in a model in which
there are multiple equilibria agents may ﬁnd it useful to coordinate in
a unique RE equilibrium. This equilibrium can be supported by a self-
fulﬁlling forecast rule having the property of being independent of the
parameters characterizing the probability distribution of the fundamentals
of the economy. In particular, the rule is independent of the parameters
governing the process of economic policy. In other words, Farmer’s hypothesis
is that the Lucas Critique may not apply in some contexts because agents
may coordinate their expectations in the Lucas proof (LP) RE equilibrium.1
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the performance of the LP equilibrium
in the context of the term structure model of interest rate.2 Why do we choose
this context? Beginning with Mankiw and Miron (1986), many economists
have found that the predictive content of the long-short term spread for
changes in the short rate has changed substantially over time.3 Moreover, the
role played by the short-term rate as a monetary policy instrument changed
in the post-war period in the US (for instance, the so-called Volcker monetary
policy experiment that switched from an interest rate target to a money stock
target).4 All these changes suggest that the short-term rate process has been
switching between alternative policy regimes. Thus, LP equilibrium is likely
to perform well in this context because agents facing frequent changes in
policy regime may choose a self-fulﬁlling forecast rule which is immune to
the Lucas Critique as a way of hedging against unanticipated policy regime
switches.
We argue that one can distinguish two types of period during US post-
war. On the one hand, there are periods where the short-term rate behaves
1Farmer (1991) suggests immunity to the Lucas Critique as a selection criterion in
models with multiple non-exploding equilibria. Moreover, as Farmer (1992) points out,
evidence against the Lucas Critique should not be viewed as evidence against the RE
hypothesis, although it is evidence against the so called feedforward view of expectations.
2There some papers in the literature testing the Lucas Critique. For instance, Favero
and Hendry (1992) tests the Lucas Critique in the context of US money demand. Moreover,
Vázquez (2002) tests the Lucas Critique using data from four hyperinﬂationary episodes.
3Many more recent papers (Hamilton, 1988; Sola and Driﬃll, 1994; Evans and Lewis,
1995; Ang and Bekaert, 2002; among others) have shown evidence of (frequent) regime
switches in the term structure of US interest rates. Moreover, by allowing the possibility
of regime switches Hamilton (1988) and Sola and Driﬃll (1994) have shown that the RE
model of the term structure is not rejected by the data.
4See Rudebusch (1995) for details.
2as a random walk and the term spread has no predictive content for changes
in the short rate. Roughly speaking, these periods are also characterized by
relatively low, stable interest rates and inﬂation. Economists have argued
that the near random walk behavior of US short rates is due to US Fed
actions for interest rate smoothing.5 A possible explanation for the interest
rate smoothing policy in a context of low, stable interest rates is that
the Fed may have no reason to aﬀect the level of interest rates. In this
scenario, monetary policy would only aim at keeping the changes in the
short-term rate stable and unpredictable. Stable changes in the short-term
rate would help macroeconomic stability whereas unpredictable changes in
the short rate would allow Fed money market interventions to be anonymous;
thus, movements in the short-term rate would reﬂect the degree of liquidity
shortage to money market participants.
On the other hand, there are periods where the short-term rate is still
persistent (i.e., the short rate follows a unit root process) but the term
spread has some ability to predict short rate changes. These periods are
characterized by high, volatile interest rates and inﬂation. McCallum (1994)
argues that one reason for a positive relationship between changes in the
short rate and term spread may be that the US Fed tends to tighten monetary
policy when the term spread is large, signalling inﬂationary tensions.6
These considerations suggest that the scale of the response of the short
rate depends on the level of the term spread. Thus, the response is small
and non-signiﬁcant when the term spread is low, stable and becomes positive
when the spread is high, volatile. This paper shows that all these features
emerge when estimating a bivariate Markov switching VAR model using post-
war US interest rate data from the long end of the maturity spectrum.
Our approach for evaluating the performance of the LP equilibrium can be
described as follows. First, we consider a bivariate Markov regime switching
VAR model as a benchmark model to evaluate the performance of alternative
RE equilibria. Ang and Bekaert (2002) have shown that this benchmark
model performs well both in forecasting interest rates and in replicating
5As pointed out by McCallum (1994), there is no general consensus on why the US Fed
follows an interest rate smoothing policy. However, the general view is that the US Fed
in fact employed such a policy during the post-war period.
6As pointed out by McCallum (1994), in actual practice the US Fed uses other predictor
variables instead of the term spread in order to adjust monetary policy when inﬂationary
tensions and recessions are foreseen. But to the extent that these indicators and the
spread are closely related (as shown by Mishkin, 1990, and Estrella and Mishkin, 1997,
among others, the spread is a good indicator of expected changes in inﬂation and economic
activity), analysis of interest rate policy responses based on the term spread makes sense.
In section 2, we argue that the process assumed for the short-term rate can be viewed as
a particular version of the Taylor rule (see Taylor, 1993).
3short rate non-linearities found in non-parametric studies (for instance, Aït-
Sahalia, 1996). Moreover, we show in Appendix 1 that this benchmark model
displays the interest rate dynamics obtained estimating an unrestricted four-
variable Markov switching VAR model that includes the short-long term
spread, the short rate, the output gap and inﬂation. In short, the benchmark
model can be viewed as a parsimonious yet adequate characterization of the
joint dynamics of the long and short-term rates. Second, it is shown formally
that the LP and the fundamental equilibrium solutions ﬁt into the benchmark
model under diﬀerent sets of parameter restrictions. Finally, we evaluate the
performance of the LP and the fundamental equilibria in replicating the
features exhibited by the benchmark model.
The estimation results show that the parameter restrictions imposed by
the LP equilibrium on the benchmark model are rejected when using a
likelihood ratio test or Akaike information criterion (AIC). However, using
Schwarz (SIC) or Hannan-Quinn (HQ) model selection criteria that penalize
over-parametrizations, the LP equilibrium is chosen instead of the benchmark
model. More important, the estimation results show that the LP equilibrium
shares most of the relevant features found in the data by estimating the
benchmark model. For instance, the short rate behaves as a random walk in
a regime characterized by low conditional volatility, whereas the changes in
the short rate are determined by the term spread in periods characterized by
high conditional volatility. Furthermore, the term spread is more persistent in
a regime characterized by low conditional volatility than in a regime featuring
high conditional volatility.
The estimation results also show that the fundamental equilibrium is not
chosen by any model selection criteria considered. Moreover, the fundamental
equilibrium does not reproduce many relevant features characterized by the
benchmark model and the LP equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives
the diﬀerent sets of parameter restrictions imposed by the LP and the
fundamental equilibria, respectively, on the benchmark model. Section
3 shows the empirical results and evaluates the performance of the two
alternative equilibria in reproducing the features of the term structure of
interest rates characterized by the benchmark model. Section 4 concludes.
42 THE BENCHMARK MODEL, ‘LUCAS PROOF’
AND FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA
Following Ang and Bekaert (2002) closely, we consider a Markov regime
switching ﬁrst-order VAR model of the ﬁrst-diﬀerences of the short-term
rate and the term spread as a benchmark model. A similar model, which
includes the short rate in levels instead of the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the short
rate, has been proven to perform well in forecasting interest rates and in
replicating the non-linearity features displayed by interest rates. Formally,
the benchmark model can be written as follows
Yt = µ(st)+A(st)Yt−1 + Σ(st)
1/2εt, (1)
where Yt =( Rt − rt,r t − rt−1)0 and εt ∼ N(0,I). Rt, rt and Rt − rt denote
the long-term, short-term and the spread term, respectively. The regime
variable st is either 1 or 2 and follows a ﬁrst-order two-state Markov process
with prob(st =1 |st−1 =1 )=p and prob(st =2 |st−1 =2 )=q. We estimate
the Cholesky decomposition Φ(st) of Σ(st) where Σ(st)=Φ(st)Φ(st)0.
As shown by Shiller’s (1979) seminal paper, the RE theory of the term
structure of interest rates postulates the following relation between a long-
term rate and a short-term rate




iEtrt+i + c, (2)
where Et denotes the conditional expectation operator given the information
set, It, available to the economic agents at the beginning of time t. It includes
current and past values of all random variables included in the model. δ
denotes the discount factor and c is a constant risk premium.7
Given the form of the benchmark model and in order to complete the RE
model of term structure, we further assume that the short-term interest rate
rt is characterized by the following process
rt − rt−1 = ρ0(st)+ρ1(st)(Rt−1 − rt−1)+vt, (3)
where ρ1(st) is a positive policy reaction parameter reﬂecting how changes in
the short-term interest rate try to narrow the long-short spread. vt is an i.i.d.
7We have considered the possibility of a regime-dependent risk premium. The
estimation results reject this hypothesis for the LP equilibrium, whereas a state-dependent
risk premium emerges under the fundamental equilibrium when the discount factor is
estimated jointly with the other free parameters. These estimation results are available
upon request. In any case, the inclusion of a regime-dependent risk premium does not
alter any of the conclusions reached in this paper.
5random variable with mean zero and variance σ2
v(st). vt is included in It since
rt and st are also included. Parameters ρ0(st), ρ1(st) and σv(st) are assumed
to follow a two-state Markov process in order to model a diﬀerent policy
reaction function depending on the foreseen inﬂationary tensions captured
by the term spread. One should expect the short rate to behave as a random
walk during periods characterized by low, stable interest rates in which the
term spread is also low and stable. Contrariwise, one should also expect the
short rate to react positively when the term spread is high and volatile since
a high, volatile spread indicates the need for restrictive monetary policy (an
increase in the short rate) in order to ﬁght inﬂation.
Readers familiar with the popular Taylor rule may wonder why we do
not consider output gaps and inﬂation to characterize the short-term rate
dynamics. However, there are at least three compelling reasons for following
the approach suggested in this paper. First, Estrella and Mishkin (1997)
have shown robust empirical evidence that the term spread contains useful
information concerning market expectations of both future real activity and
inﬂation and that the spread summarizes predictive information that is not
captured by the variables entering into a typical Taylor rule. Thus, the
parsimonious process assumed for the short-term rate (3) can be viewed as
a simple version of the Taylor rule where the term spread summarizes at
least such relevant predictive information as expected output and inﬂation.
Second, as shown below in Appendix 1, the simple benchmark model (1)
captures the dynamics of the short rate well and the spread obtained
estimating a four-variable Markov switching VAR model that includes the
term spread, the ﬁrst-diﬀerences of the short rate, the output gap and
inﬂation.8 Finally, Ang and Bekaert (2002) have shown that the benchmark
model is ﬂexible enough to replicate the short-term rate non-linearities
estimated by Aït-Sahalia using nonparametric econometric techniques.
Taking into account equation (2) to evaluate EtRt+1 and subtracting
δEtRt+1 from (2) we obtain
Rt =( 1− δ)rt + δEtRt+1 + c(1 − δ). (4)
Equations (3) and (4) form a bivariate system of diﬀerence equations.
Using the undetermined coeﬃcient method we begin by writing Rt as a linear
function of a minimal set of state variables: rt, and a constant that is state
8Moreover, in Appendix 1 we also compare the estimation results from the single
equation (3) with those obtained from the same equation adding current inﬂation and
the output gap as additional explanatory variables in the direction posited by the Taylor
rule. The conclusion is that the results are quantitatively similar for all the short-term
rate processes considered.
6dependant,
Rt = π0(st)+π1(st)rt. (5)
By using McCallum’s (1983) criterion, we can identify a unique fundamental
RE solution given by9,10
π1(1) = π1(2) = 1,
π0(1) =
A2[c(1 − δ)+δD]+δ
2(1 − p)E + cδ(1 − δ)(1 − p)
A1A2 − δ
2(1 − p)(1 − q)
, (6)
π0(2) =




A1 =1 − δ[p(1 + ρ1(1)) + (1 − p)ρ1(2)],
A2 =1 − δ[q(1 + ρ1(2)) + (1 − q)ρ1(1)],
D = pρ0(1) + (1 − p)ρ0(2),
E = qρ0(2) + (1 − q)ρ0(1).
Given that π1(1) = π1(2) = 1, we can then estimate the following
restricted bivariate system characterized by the unique fundamental RE
equilibrium that satisﬁes McCallum’s criterion:
Rt − rt = π0(st)+θ(st)ut,
rt − rt−1 = ρ0(st)+ρ1(st)[Rt−1 − rt−1]+vt. (7)
Notice that we have augmented the bivariate system that characterizes the
fundamental RE equilibrium with an i.i.d. standard normal variable, ut,
which may be interpreted as a measurement error, and θ1 and θ2 are positive
constants.
In addition to the fundamental RE equilibrium, (7), the term structure
model of interest rates, equation (2), exhibits another RE equilibrium






rt−1 +( 1− δ
−1)c + ²t, (8)
9Finding the solution involves simple, but tedious, algebra. This mathematical
workings are available from the author upon request.
10McCallum (1983) suggests the minimum state variable criterion to single out a unique
RE equilibrium solution in a context of multiple equilibria with the additional requirement
that the solution must be valid for any admissible parameter value of the forcing variable
process. In particular, it can be shown that the former equilibrium solution is the unique
RE fundamental equilibrium because it is the only one that is a function of a minimal
set of state variables and remains valid for any admissible parameter value of the forcing
variable (short-term rate) process. For instance, it is the unique fundamental equilibrium
when there is a single state (that is, if p =1 ).
7where ²t is an arbitrary martingale diﬀerence with respect to It−1 (that is,
²t = Rt − Et−1Rt is the rational prediction error).11 It must be clear that
equation (8) is the equilibrium solution of Rt supported by the following






rt−1 +( 1− δ
−1)c.
Notice that the long-term rate equilibrium solution (8) is an LP equilibrium
solution because it is supported by a forecast rule which is not dependent on
the parameters characterizing the short rate process (i.e., ρ’s). Moreover, the
LP equilibrium implies that for reasonable parametrizations of the discount
factor (that is, δ ≈ 1), changes in the short-term rate cannot substantially
aﬀect the long-term rate. This result is consistent with the evidence reported
by Evans and Marshall (2000), who found that monetary policy shocks have
large eﬀects on short rates, but a much smaller eﬀect on long rates.
By subtracting rt on both sides of the LP equilibrium solution (8) and
using (3), the LP equilibrium can be written as
Rt − rt =( 1 − δ
−1)c − ρ0(st)+[ δ
−1 − ρ1(st)](Rt−1 − rt−1)
+²t − vt. (9)
The LP equilibrium characterized by equations (9) and (3) and the
fundamental equilibrium characterized by system (7) impose diﬀerent sets
of parameter restrictions on the benchmark model (1). The main diﬀerence
between the two alternative equilibria is that the term spread under the
LP equilibrium follows a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process whereas the term
spread under the fundamental equilibrium does not depend on lagged term
spread.
The idea that an economy is located in an LP equilibrium when agents
face frequent monetary policy regime switches is a controversial one. On
the one hand, one may think that an LP equilibrium is likely to be
supported when agents face frequent changes in policy regime. So agents
may ﬁnd it useful to choose a self-fulﬁlling forecast rule which is independent
of the parameters describing the process of monetary policy (that is, a
forecast rule which is immune to the Lucas Critique) as a way of hedging
against unanticipated policy regime switches. On the other hand, one could
argue that frequent monetary policy changes can reduce the likelihood of
expectations being policy independent. By estimating the benchmark model
11See Broze and Szafarz (1991, chapter 2) for a detailed discussion on the non-uniqueness
issue. Moreover, Gutiérrez and Vázquez (2002) provides an analysis of the diﬀerent
dynamic features displayed by alternative RE in the context of present value models with
feedback like the one considered in this paper.
8and the alternative RE equilibrium solutions we can evaluate and compare
the performance of the two alternative equilibria. The next section follows
this approach.
3 ESTIMATION AND EVALUATION OF THE
TWO ALTERNATIVE EQUILIBRIA
The alternative models considered in this paper are estimated using two
m o n t h l yU ST r e a s u r yy i e l ds e r i e s( 1 -month US Treasury bill rate and US
Treasury 20-year yields) available from January 1950 to July 1992 from
Salomon Brothers’ Analytical Record of Yields and Yield Spreads (1992).12
We focus our attention on the long end of the maturity spectrum because, as
pointed out by Mankiw and Miron (1986) in their conclusions, the analysis
of the relation between a short-term rate and the rate for twenty-year bonds
is probably more important for macroeconomic policy than the empirical
analysis based on interest rate data from the short end of the maturity
spectrum. Moreover, the sample covers a large period of time in the post-war
period where it is plausible that various regime switches may have occurred.13
The maximum likelihood estimation of the alternative Markov regime
switching models considered in this paper follows the recursive algorithm
suggested by Hamilton (1994, ch. 22). Appendix 2 brieﬂy summarizes this
algorithm.
12The 1-month Treasury bill rates are shown on a discount basis whereas the Treasury
20-year yields are shown on a bond yield basis. In order to get the appropriate bond yield
associated with the 1-month Treasury bill rate we use the Conversion Table for issues
Quoted on a Discount Basis, displayed in Salomon Brothers’ Analytical Record of Yields
and Yield Spreads. Thus, by adding the appropriate percentage shown in the Conversion
Table to the discount yield, we obtain the 1-month Treasury bill rate on a bond yield
basis.
13Moreover, our choice of data set is determined by the fact that the treasury 20-year
yields time series are not available for several years during the nineties. Nevertheless, the
last decade has been characterized by a smooth evolution of interest rates, so the inclusion
of more recent data is not likely to aﬀect the empirical evidence found on switching regimes
during the seventies and eightees.
9Table 1. Estimation results for the benchmark model (spread term and ﬁrst
diﬀerences of the short rate)

























Notes for Tables 1-3 and 6-8: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors
are shown. The Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn model selection criteria
are computed as AIC = −2L +2 n, SIC = −2L +2 nln(T) and HQ =
−2L+2nln(ln(T)), respectively, where L is the maximum value of the Gaussian
log-likelihood function, n is the number of estimated parameters and T = 510 is
the number of observations.
3.1 Estimation results for the benchmark model
Table 1 shows the estimation results for the benchmark model (1). These
estimation results can be summarized as follows. First, there are two
alternative regimes, one of which (say regime 1) is more persistent than
the other (regime 2). Thus, the estimated value of p is signiﬁcantly larger
10than q.14 Furthermore, the persistence of the system in each regime can be
measured through the moduli of the eigenvalues for the companion matrices
A(1) (0.9491 and −0.0192)a n dA(2) (0.8444 and −0.0436), showing that the
ﬁrst regime is clearly more persistent. Second, the conditional covariances
are signiﬁcantly larger in the second regime than in the ﬁrst. Moreover, the
sample correlation between the annualized rate of inﬂation and the second
regime smoothed probabilities is found to be 0.4986. This value implies that
the highly conditional volatility regime is associated with inﬂation although,
as pointed out by Evans and Lewis (1995) and Ang and Bekaert (2002),
the ﬁtb e t w e e ni n ﬂation and the highly conditional volatility regime is not
perfect.
3.2 A comparison with Ang and Bekaert’s results
In order to compare our estimation results with those of Ang and Bekaert
(2002), the benchmark model is estimated by including the short-rate in
levels instead of the ﬁrst-diﬀerence of the short-term rate. Moreover, the
benchmark model is also estimated by allowing for time-varying transition
probabilities. These estimation results are displayed in Appendix 3: Tables
A.3-A.5. The estimation results show that the short rate process is also
characterized by a unit-root in the second regime when the short rate
responds to changes in the spread. This result supports the choice of
considering the ﬁrst-diﬀerences of the short rate instead of the level of the
short rate when estimating the benchmark model.
Although our data set is diﬀerent from the one considered by Ang and
Bekaert,15 our estimation results are to some extent similar to those found
by them using US data, with two main exceptions. First, considering time-
varying transition probabilities does not improve the ﬁt of the benchmark
model for our sample. Second, for our sample, we reject the hypothesis
that short rate and spread Granger-cause each other for the low conditional
volatility regime (regime 1), while also rejecting the hypothesis that the
spread does not Granger-cause the short rate for the high conditional
volatility regime (regime 2). However, Ang and Bekaert obtained quite
diﬀerent conclusions.16
14From now on, by saying that an estimated parameter is signiﬁcantly larger than other
estimated parameter we mean that the 95% conﬁdence intervals associated with the two
estimated parameters do not overlap.
15Ang and Bekaert work with monthly observations on 3-month short rates and 5-year
long rates of zero coupons from the US, Germany and UK from January 1972 to August
1996.
16In our view their empirical results are at odds with their economic interpretation
11One possible explanation for these diﬀerent results is that our sample is
rather diﬀerent from the one considered by Ang and Bekaert since our sample
period includes the ﬁfties and the sixties (almost half of the sample), which
were characterized by lower and more stable interest rates and spreads than
those observed in the rest of the sample. Table A.6, displayed in Appendix
3, shows a summary of statistics of data. Many of the statistics shown in
this table are quite diﬀerent from the ones reported by Ang and Bekaert’s
Table 1. In Subsection 3.4, we show the estimation results for the alternative
models studied in this paper using data from a sub-sample (running from
1972:1 to 1992:7) similar to the one analyzed by Ang and Bekaert.
Moreover, the estimation of the benchmark model including the short rate
in levels and time-varying transition probabilities allows us to analyze the
robustness of the results by imposing the unit root restriction on the short
rate and considering constant transition probabilities when estimating the
benchmark model. Since the estimation results in Table 1 are quantitatively
similar to those in Tables A.3-A.5, we will impose the unit root restriction
in both regimes and the assumption of constant transition probabilities from
now on.17
3.3 Evaluation of the LP equilibrium
Table 2 shows the estimation results for the LP equilibrium described by
the bivariate system (9)-(3).18 The estimation results from this equilibrium
share several features displayed by the benchmark model. Namely, regime
(see Ang and Bekaert (2002, p.1257). For instance, they claim that the ﬁrst regime
corresponds to periods where the short rate behaves as a random walk. It must be the
case, therefore, that the term spread does not Granger-cause the short rate during the
ﬁrst regime; however, they obtain evidence in the opposite direction. Contrariwise, in
the second regime where the spread is large, volatile, one should expect the spread to
Granger-cause the short rates since short rates react positively to the term spread in order
to ﬁght inﬂation under this regime, but they have evidence that once again contradicts
this intuition.
17Moreover, standard integration and cointegration tests (see Table A.7 in Appendix 3)
do not reject the hypotheses that the short rate and the long rate follow I(1) processes
and that the two rates are cointegrated, i.e., the term spread is stationary.
18In the estimation of the LP and fundamental equilibria, the discount factor δ is ﬁxed
at 0.9958428. This value is consistent with the sample mean of the long-term rate. This
value is close to the value of δ =0 .9951321 chosen by Campbell and Shiller (1987,
p.1074, footnote #18). The next subsection shows the estimation results for the LP
and fundamental equilibria for two alternative parametrizations of δ (δ =0 .9877078 and
δ =0 .9983511) that correspond to two extreme values for the population mean of the
long-term rate (16% and 2%, respectively).
121 is more persistent than regime 2. Thus, the estimated value of p is
signiﬁcantly larger than q and they are similar to the estimated values found
in the benchmark model. Moreover, the term spread is more persistent in
the ﬁrst regime than in the second (that is, [δ
−1 − ρ1(1)])i sl a r g e rt h a n
[δ
−1 − ρ1(2)]). Second, the conditional covariances in the second regime are
signiﬁcantly larger than those found in the ﬁrst. Third, the ﬁrst-diﬀerence
of the short-term rate is a purely random noise in the ﬁrst regime under the
benchmark model and the LP equilibrium since a21(1), a22(1) and ρ1(1) are
not signiﬁcant, whereas the short-term rate positively reacts with changes in
the term spread in the second regime under the two models (a21(2) and ρ1(2)
are signiﬁcant at standard conﬁdence levels). Fourth, a non-signiﬁcant risk
premium, c, together with a non-signiﬁcant ρ0(1) is consistent with µ1(1) not
being signiﬁcant. Moreover, a signiﬁcant ρ0(2) is consistent with µ1(2) being
signiﬁcant.
Table 2. Estimation results for the LP equilibrium


















One can test the parameter restrictions imposed by the LP equilibrium on
t h eb e n c h m a r km o d e lu s i n gal i k e l i h o o dr a t i ot e s ts t a t i s t i ct h a ti nt h i sc a s ei s
distributed as χ2(7). This statistic takes the value 24.58, which implies that
the parameter restrictions imposed by the LP equilibrium on the benchmark
model are rejected by the data at any standard signiﬁcance level. A similar
conclusion is reached using the Akaike information criterion (AIC). However,
13when using Schwarz (SIC) or Hannan-Quinn (HQ) information criteria the
LP equilibrium is selected instead of the benchmark model. The reason for
these results is that SIC and HQ selection criteria penalize the inclusion of
additional free parameters in the model more than AIC and the likelihood
ratio test.
Table 3. Estimation results for the fundamental equilibrium

















Table 3 shows the estimation results for the fundamental equilibrium
described by the bivariate system (7). Any model selection criteria considered
(likelihood ratio test, AIC, SIC and HQ) rejects the fundamental equilibrium
in favor of the LP equilibrium. In particular, the likelihood ratio test statistic
that in this case is distributed as a χ2(2) t a k e st h ev a l u eo f2472.786,w h i c h
implies overwhelming rejection of the fundamental equilibrium in favor of
the LP equilibrium. The estimation results from this equilibrium share
some features displayed by the benchmark model and the LP equilibrium.
Thus, regime 1 is more persistent than regime 2 since the estimated value
of p is signiﬁcantly larger than q, but the estimate of q is signiﬁcantly
larger than those obtained in the benchmark model and the LP equilibrium.
Second, the conditional covariances in the second regime are signiﬁcantly
larger than in the ﬁrst. However, as shown in Section 2, the term spread
does not show any persistence under the fundamental equilibrium since the
coeﬃcient associated with (Rt−1 − rt−1) for any regime must be zero under
14this equilibrium by deﬁnition. Moreover, estimation results obtained from
the fundamental equilibrium diﬀer from those obtained in the benchmark
model and the LP equilibrium. Thus, the coeﬃcient associated with the
lagged term spread in the short-term rate equation is signiﬁcant in regime 1
but not in regime 2. The opposite is true both for the benchmark model and
for the LP equilibrium.
Figure 1 shows that the benchmark model and the LP equilibrium ﬁtt h e
actual term spread reasonably well. However, the fundamental equilibrium
fails badly to reproduce the evolution of the actual term spread. The reason is
that the term spread is a (regime-dependent) constant under the fundamental
equilibrium.
Figure 2 shows the allocation of time periods based on the smoothed
probabilities associated with the ﬁr s tr e g i m ef o rt h eb e n c h m a r km o d e l
(upper-left graph), LP equilibrium (upper-right graph) and fundamental
equilibrium (lower-left graph), respectively, together with a plot of inﬂation
rate time series (lower-right graph). We observe that the smoothed
probabilities for the benchmark model are almost identical to those found
for the LP equilibrium. The ﬁfties and sixties are allocated mostly to state 1
(characterized by low volatility and no response of the short rate to changes
in the term spread), with brief departures in the late ﬁfties and early sixties.
The sub-sample from the late sixties to the mid-seventies is characterized by
frequent jumps from one state to the other and the second half of the seventies
is attributed mostly to state 1. The early eighties are entirely allocated
to state 2 (characterized by high volatility and responses of the short rate
to changes in the term spread). Finally, the sub-sample from 1984 to the
end of the sample is also mainly characterized by state 2, with some brief
departures. The estimation results show a strong connection between the
periods characterized by major shocks/high inﬂation (as was the case with
the two oil shocks in the mid-seventies and the ﬁrst half of the eighties, the
Volcker monetary experiment in the period 1980-1983, and also around 1990
with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war) and state 2, where
monetary authorities are more likely to switch policy to a regime where the
short rate response to the term spread is larger since the spread anticipates
inﬂationary tensions and the need for a restrictive monetary policy.
15Figure 1: Actual and Fitted Term Spreads
16The estimation results also suggest a rather weak connection between the
allocation of periods to the two states and the Federal Reserve chairman.19
Thus, state 1 mainly characterizes the term structure of interest rates during
the term of oﬃce of Fed chairman Martin (1951:4-1970:1). In the seventies,
which cover the terms of oﬃce of Burns (1970:2-1978:1) and Miller (1978:3-
1979:8), the ﬁrst half of the decade is characterized by frequent jumps from
one state to the other whereas the second half is attributed mostly to state
1. The ﬁr s th a l fo ft h et e r mo fo ﬃc eo fF e dc h a i r m a nV o l c k e r ,i d e n t i ﬁed as
the Volcker monetary experiment (1979:10-1983:10), is entirely attributed to
state 2.20 Finally, the second half of Volcker’s term of oﬃce and the ﬁrst part
of Greenspan’s (1987:8-1992:7) are mostly attributed to state 2, with some
brief departures.
In spite of its simplicity, it is noticeable that the smoothed probabilities
associated with the fundamental equilibrium do not diﬀer substantially
from the ones implied by the other two models. The main diﬀerences are
concentrated in the seventies and around the 1987 stock market crash. The
above results suggest that the allocation of time periods between regimes is
fairly robust to the alternative models/equilibria considered in this paper.21
3.4 Some sensitivity analyses
In this subsection, we analyze the robustness of the results in three
directions. First, we perform a sensitivity analysis by considering two
extreme values for the discount factor δ. Second, we re-estimate the
alternative models/equilibria for the sample period 1950:1-1979-9. As
mentioned above, the beginning of the eighties was a period characterized by
high interest rates associated with the Volcker experiment and the second
oil shock. Given the importance of this period for the empirical results
associated with any study of the term structure, it is relevant to analyze
19Obviously, the relation between switches in the term structure and the changes in the
Federal Reserve Chairman is necessarily weak due to policy lags. For instance, switches
in monetary policy in some cases could take place several months after the new chairman
takes oﬃce since new monetary policy operating rules have to be designed ﬁrst. Moreover,
some monetary policies could take some time before they induce changes in the term
structure. By contrast, other monetary policies could be anticipated by economic agents,
thus aﬀecting the term structure even before they are implemented.
20The term of oﬃce of Fed chairman Volcker ran from October 1979 to August 1987.
21The model assumes that st as an exogenous variable. Therefore, one would
be concerned if the estimated smoothed probabilities were very diﬀerent under the
two alternative equilibria because the perception of the regime would be then very
diﬀerent depending on the equilibrium in which agents coordinate (that is, st would be
endogenous!).
17Figure 2: Smoothed Probabilities and Actual Inﬂation rate
18whether the estimation results hold when we omit the last twelve years of
the sample. Third, we also study the sample period 1972:1-1992:7 because it
is similar to the one analyzed by Ang and Bekaert (2002).
Table 4. Estimation results for the LP equilibrium for alternative values of δ




























Note for Tables 4-5: Standard errors in parentheses.
Tables 4-5 show the estimation results for the LP and fundamental
equilibria for two extreme values of δ.T h ev a l u eδ =0 .9983511 corresponds
to an annualized interest rate of 2% (that is, δmonthly =( δannual)1/12 =
( 1
1+0.02)1/12 =0 .9983511)w h e r e a st h ev a l u eδ =0 .9877078 corresponds to
an annualized interest rate of 16% . As shown in Tables 4-5, the estimation
19results are robust to these two extreme parametrizations of the discount
factor δ.
Table 5. Estimation results for the fundamental equilibrium for
alternative values of δ
























Tables 6-8 show the estimation results for the benchmark model, the
LP equilibrium and the fundamental equilibrium for two sub-samples,
respectively. The estimation results for the sub-sample 1950:1-1979:9
(1972:1-1992:7) are displayed in the left (right) panel. Comparing these
estimation results with those displayed in Tables 1-3 for the whole sample, we
observe that the main results found for the whole sample hold for the two sub-
samples with two remarkable diﬀerences. First, as expected, the volatility
of the innovations drops,22 especially in the second regime, when considering
22The volatility of the innovations in the benchmark model and in the LP equilibrium
is estimated by computing the eigenvalues of the variance-covariance matrix of the
innovations Σ(i) for i =1 ,2 in each case.
20the sub-sample 1950:1-1979:9 since a large portion of shocks in the sample
took place in the ﬁrst half of the eighties. Contrariwise, when considering
the sub-sample 1972:1-1992:7 the volatility of innovations increases slightly
in each regime. Second, we do not reject the hypothesis that the spread does
not Granger-cause the short rate for the high conditional volatility regime
(regime 2) at the 5% critical signiﬁcance level, but it is rejected at the 10%
signiﬁc a n c el e v e l ,a sw a st h ec a s ef o rt h ew h o l es a m p l e .
Table 6. Estimation results for the benchmark model (spread term and ﬁrst
diﬀerences of the short rate) for two alternative sub-samples
Sub-sample 1950:1 to 1979:10 1972:1 to 1992:7
Estimate Stand. Error Estimate Stand. Error
µ1(1) 0.0581 0.0465 0.0127 0.0550
µ2(1) 0.0112 0.0364 0.0708 0.0652
µ1(2) 0.0920 0.0723 0.4162 0.1901
µ2(2) −0.0879 0.0769 −0.3364 0.2340
a11(1) 0.9408 0.0468 0.9573 0.0184
a12(1) 0.1069 0.1400 0.0000 0.0270
a21(1) 0.0102 0.0370 −0.0059 0.0211
a22(1) −0.1520 0.0989 −0.0206 0.0286
a11(2) 0.9000 0.0570 0.8155 0.0740
a12(2) 0.0310 0.1417 0.0529 0.1406
a21(2) 0.1177 0.0655 0.1602 0.0904
a22(2) 0.0919 0.1391 −0.0216 0.1721
φ11(1) 0.1857 0.0208 0.2142 0.0275
φ12(1) −0.1727 0.0203 −0.1918 0.0351
φ22(1) 0.0476 0.0097 0.1501 0.0130
φ11(2) 0.5506 0.0486 1.1720 0.1075
φ12(2) −0.5305 0.0539 −1.1782 0.1270
φ22(2) 0.2139 0.0231 0.5341 0.0382
p 0.9776 0.0093 0.9732 0.0112





21Table 7. Estimation results for the LP equilibrium for two alternative
sub-samples
Sub-samples 1950:1 to 1979:19 1972:1 to 1992:7
Estimate Stand. Error Estimate Stand. Error
ρ0(1) 0.0816 0.0441 0.1145 0.1150
ρ0(2) −0.1224 0.0688 −0.6149 0.2475
ρ1(1) −0.0404 0.0408 −0.0121 0.0409
ρ1(2) 0.1457 0.0447 0.2644 0.1038
c −4.5865 1.1804 2.7741 7.7087
φ11(1) 0.0431 0.0039 0.2021 0.0284
φ12(1) −0.0079 0.0218 0.0694 0.0631
φ22(1) 0.2037 0.0263 0.2856 0.0560
φ11(2) 0.2241 0.0181 0.6018 0.0536
φ12(2) 0.1809 0.0384 0.7130 0.1898
φ22(2) 0.5200 0.0401 1.2828 0.1401
p 0.9822 0.0073 0.9728 0.0103





Table 8. Estimation results for the fundamental equilibrium for two
alternative sub-samples
Sub-samples 1950:1 to 1979:10 1972:1 to 1992:7
Estimate Stand. Error Estimate Stand. Error
ρ0(1) −0.5695 0.1102 0.0852 0.0559
ρ0(2) 0.0173 0.0488 −0.7749 0.3352
ρ1(1) 0.6099 0.0793 0.4388 0.0955
ρ1(2) 0.0072 0.0374 0.3165 0.1120
σv(1) 0.1932 0.0367 0.5636 0.0846
σv(2) 0.4706 0.0501 0.9559 0.1119
p 0.9812 0.0282 0.9901 0.0062
q 0.9412 0.0089 0.9789 0.0047
c −3.9787 3.4144 −12.6353 10.9931
θ(1) 0.2719 0.0416 0.5797 0.0676





223.5 Dynamic simulation exercises
In this subsection, we carry out some dynamic simulation exercises in order
to highlight the relative merits of the two alternative equilibria.23 Using
the estimated benchmark model as the data generating process (DGP), we
can generate synthetic time series of Yt =( Rt − rt,r t − rt−1)0.24 Then,
by changing some key parameters of the DGP, we can establish in which
scenarios one equilibrium model systematically outperforms the other and in
which scenarios the two equilibria are observationally equivalent in terms of
some measures of goodness-of-ﬁt. We use the maximized log-likelihood value
and the AIC, SIC and HQ criteria as measures of goodness-of-ﬁt.
We pay attention to two types of parameter in the dynamic simulation
exercises. First, the parameters p and q characterizing the transition
probability matrix. Higher values for these parameters imply that switching
regimes become less likely, thus increasing the chances of the fundamental
equilibrium being chosen instead of the LP equilibrium. Second, the
parameters of A(st) for st =1 ,2 that measure the persistence of the system
in each regime. Since the term spread under the fundamental equilibria is
a regime-dependent constant (i.e., it shows no persistence), we focus our
attention on alternative parametrizations of the parameters a11(st).
Table 9 shows the SIC statistics for the fundamental (ﬁrst number in
the box) and LP (second number in the box) equilibria for alternative
parametrizations of the transition probability matrix. These statistics clearly
point out that the LP equilibrium outperforms the fundamental equilibrium
for every parametrization analyzed.25 H o w e v e r ,t h er e l a t i v eo u t p e r f o r m i n go f
the LP equilibrium with respect to the fundamental equilibrium decreases as
p and q increase. This result is quite intuitive. As the persistence of the two
states increases regime-switching becomes less likely and then the advantage
of coordinating in the LP equilibrium decreases.
Table 10 shows some measures of goodness-of-ﬁtf o rt h et w oa l t e r n a t i v e
equilibria for diﬀerent parametrizations of a11(st) that are in the interval from
seven to ten times smaller than the parameter estimates found estimating
the benchmark model. We observe that a11(st) must be at least nine
times smaller than those found estimating the benchmark model for the
fundamental equilibrium to ﬁt better than the LP equilibrium.
23I am indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting this exercise.
24The length of simulated time series is chosen to be equal to the length of the actual
time series. The reason is that sample moments may diﬀer substantially from population
moments when stationary time series are highly persistent, such as the term spread process
implied by the benchmark model.
25Results are identical if we use other measures of goodness-of-ﬁt. We do not show them
to save space.
23Table 9. Performance comparison between the two equilibria for various
conﬁgurations of the transition matrix
p =0 .9904 p =0 .9868
q =0 .9904 2822.63 // 1279.77 2585.10 // 1023.64
q =0 .9854 2213.54 // 467.67 2715.07 // 1142.02
q =0 .9726 1956.73 // 198.52 2076.22 // 338.68
q =0 .8925 1646.13 // −108.08 1820.49 // 63.80
Note: Each box contains two numbers: the ﬁrst (second) corresponds to the
SIC statistic associated with the fundamental (LP) equilibrium.
The main message provide by these dynamic simulation exercises is
simple. The LP equilibrium outperforms the fundamental equilibrium mainly
because the former is capable of reproducing the high persistence of the actual
term spread in each regime whereas the term spread under the fundamental
equilibrium shows no persistence by deﬁnition (i.e., it is a regime-dependent
constant).
Table 10. Performance comparison between the two equilibria for various
conﬁgurations of a11(st)
Fundamental equil. LP equilibrium
L = −412.04 L = −416.47
a11(1) = (0.9489)/10 AIC = 846.07 AIC = 858.95
a11(2) = (0.8337)/10 SIC = 960.75 SIC = 994.48
HQ = 864.26 HQ = 880.44
L = −411.58 L = −411.24
a11(1) = (0.9489)/9 AIC = 845.15 AIC = 848.47
a11(2) = (0.8337)/9 SIC = 959.83 SIC = 984.00
HQ = 863.34 HQ = 869.96
L = −411.12 L = −404.63
a11(1) = (0.9489)/8 AIC = 844.24 AIC = 835.25
a11(2) = (0.8337)/8 SIC = 958.91 SIC = 970.78
HQ = 862.42 HQ = 856.74
L = −410.73 L = −396.02
a11(1) = (0.9489)/7 AIC = 843.46 AIC = 818.05
a11(2) = (0.8337)/7 SIC = 958.14 SIC = 953.58
HQ = 861.65 HQ = 839.54
244C O N C L U S I O N S
There is much literature showing evidence of frequent regime switches in
US short-term interest rates. Economists have related these switches to
changes in monetary policy. Thus, the smoothing policy of interest rates
carried out by US Fed during low inﬂation periods makes the short rates
behave as a random walk. However, when extraordinary shocks occur and
inﬂation and term spread become higher and more volatile, policy makers
can switch monetary policy to an alternative regime where the short rate
responds positively to large, volatile term spread in order to ﬁght inﬂation.
In this paper we argue that agents facing frequent policy regime switches
may ﬁnd it useful to coordinate their expectations in a Lucas proof
equilibrium as a way of hedging against unanticipated monetary policy
regime switches. Using post-war US interest rate data, we evaluate the
performance of the Lucas proof equilibrium. Estimation results show that
the Lucas proof equilibrium exhibits the following important features of the
data that are not well reproduced by the fundamental equilibrium. First,
the short-term rate behaves as a random walk in a regime characterized by
low conditional volatility, whereas the term spread Granger-causes the short-
rate in periods characterized by high conditional volatility. Second, the term
spread is highly persistent especially in the low conditional volatility regime.
Moreover, the result that movements in the short-term rate have negligible
eﬀects on long-term rates under the Lucas proof equilibrium is consistent
with the evidence found by Evans and Marshall (2000) that monetary policy
shocks have much smaller eﬀects on long-term rates than on short-term rates.
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In this appendix, we estimate a Markov regime switching VAR model that
includes the term spread, the ﬁrst-diﬀerences of the short-term rate, the
output gap and inﬂation. Formally,
Zt = Υ(st)+B(st)Zt−1 + Ω(st)
1/2ξt, (A.1)
where Zt =( Rt−rt,r t−rt−1,∆pt,y t)0 and ξt ∼ N(0,I). ∆pt denotes current
inﬂation and yt is the output gap measured as the percentage deviation
of output from its long-run trend. This trend component is obtained by
adjusting a quadratic trend to the natural logarithm of output.26 We estimate
the Cholesky decomposition Ψ(st) of Ω(st) where Ω(st)=Ψ(st)Ψ(st)0.
The estimation results for (A.1) are shown in Table A.1. We observe that
regime 1 is more persistent than regime 2 since the estimated value of p is
signiﬁcantly larger than q. Moreover, the estimated values are similar to those
obtained estimating the benchmark model (1). Focusing on the estimates
from the ﬁr s tt w oe q u a t i o n st h a tj o i n t l yd e s c r i b et h ed y n a m i c so ft h et e r m
spread and the ﬁrst-diﬀerences of the short rate, we see that the short rate
b e h a v e sa sar a n d o mw a l ki nt h eﬁrst regime, whereas the changes in the short
rate are mainly determined by the spread in the second. More speciﬁcally,
we observe that the coeﬃcients associated with inﬂation and the output gap
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with the exception of the coeﬃcient
associated with the output gap in the second equation in the second regime.
This coeﬃcient is relatively small (i.e., b24(2) is four times smaller than the
coeﬃcient associated with the term spread, b21(2)) but signiﬁcant. Thus, the
empirical results suggest a dichotomy. Namely, the spread and the changes
in the short rate can be analyzed independently of inﬂation and output
gaps without much of loss of generality, as shown in Section 3. Figure 3
shows the allocation of time periods based on the smoothed probabilities for
the ﬁrst regime using the information over the whole sample of size T (i.e.,
prob[st =1 |IT]). Comparing this Figure with the upper-left graph in Figure
1, we observe that the allocation of time periods is almost identical in the
four-variable VAR model and in the benchmark model.
26The price level and output are measured by the consumer price index and the industrial
production index, respectively. These data were collected from the Social Science Data
Collection WebSite at University of California, San Diego (http://ssdc.ucsd.edu/citibase).
27Table A.1. Estimation results for the unrestricted four-variables VAR
model (A.1)





























































29Figure 3: Unrestricted VAR model (A.1)
Table A.1. (continued)






Notes: γi(st) denotes a generic element of vector Υ(st), bij(st) denotes a generic
element of matrix B(st) and ψij(st) denotes a generic element of matrix Ψ(st)0.
Table A.2 shows the maximum likelihood estimation results for the
following three alternative speciﬁcations for the short-term rate process:
rt − rt−1 = ρ0(st)+ρ1(st)(Rt−1 − rt−1)+vt, (A.2)
30rt − rt−1 = ρ0(st)+ρ1(st)(Rt−1 − rt−1)+ρ2(st)∆pt + vt, (A.3)
rt − rt−1 = ρ0(st)+ρ1(st)(Rt−1 − rt−1)+ρ2(st)∆pt + ρ3(st)yt + vt. (A.4)
Table A.2. Estimation of alternative short-term rate processes
T = 511 Equation (A.2) Equation (A.3) Equation (A.4)
ρ0(1) 0.0291 0.0145 −0.0017
(0.0271) (0.0317) (0.0401)
ρ0(2) −0.3693 −0.6821 −0.7097
(0.1541) (0.2433) (0.2447)
ρ1(1) 0.0003 −0.0013 0.0152
(0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0192)










σv(1) 0.2243 0.2287 0.2286
(0.0124) (0.0134) (0.0180)
σv(2) 1.2734 1.2808 1.2360
(0.0910) (0.0971) (0.1059)
p 0.9763 0.9761 0.9765
(0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0091)
q 0.8550 0.8501 0.8506
(0.0262) (0.0275) (0.0276)
L −276.522 −274.125 −266.934
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
The estimation results clearly show that for the ﬁr s tr e g i m en o n eo f
three variables considered helps to explain changes in the short-term rate.
Therefore, these estimation results conﬁrm the hypothesis that the short-
term interest rate follows a random walk in the ﬁrst regime. For the second
31Figure 4: Short-term rate process (A.2)
regime, the term spread and the output gap explain the changes in the short-
term rate and the standardized coeﬃcient associated with the term spread
is larger than the one associated with the output gap. However, inﬂation
has no explanatory power, as also occurs in the ﬁrst regime. In sum, these
estimation results are qualitatively similar to those obtained estimating the
Markov switching VAR model (A.1).
Figures 4 and 5 show the allocation of time periods between regimes
for equations (A.2) and (A.4) based on the smoothed probabilities using
information over the whole sample of size T (i.e., prob[st =1 |IT]),
respectively. In spite of the fact that the output gap helps to explain the
changes in the short rate, a comparison of Figures 4 and 5 clearly shows
that the allocation of time periods between regimes does not depend on the
inclusion of the output gap in the short-term rate process.
32Figure 5: Short-term rate process (A.4)
33APPENDIX 2
In this appendix, I brieﬂy summarize the recursive algorithm implemented
in the maximum likelihood estimation procedure. I restrict our attention
to the two-state case considered in this paper. Let θ denote the vector of
parameters. Let b ξt/t denote the 2 × 1 vector containing the econometric
inference about the values of st (=1 ,2) based on data obtained through date
t and conditional on a given value for θ.F i n a l l y ,l e tb ξt+1/t denote the 2 × 1
vector containing the one-period forecast about the values of st+1 (=1 ,2)
based on data obtained through date t. Hamilton (1994, chap. 22) shows that
t h eo p t i m a li n f e r e n c ea n dt h eo n e - p e r i o df o r e c a s tc a nb es o l v e dr e c u r s i v e l y
from the following two equations:
b ξt/t =
b ξt/t−1 ¯ ηt
10(b ξt/t−1 ¯ ηt)
,
b ξt+1/t = Pb ξt/t
where the symbol ¯ denotes element-by-element multiplication, 1 denotes a
2 × 1 vector of 1s, P is the 2 × 2 transition probability matrix and ηt is a
2×1 vector containing the two conditional densities, one for each state. For














[Yt − µ(st) − A(st)Yt−1]
0
[Σ(st)]
−1 [Yt − µ(st) − A(st)Yt−1]},
for st =1 ,2.
The log likelihood function $(θ) for the data set evaluated at a value of










b ξt/t−1 ¯ ηt
´i
.
The value of θ that maximizes $(θ) is found using the maximum
likelihood routine programmed in GAUSS. The Broyden-Fletcher-Glodfard-
Shanno numerical method is used for updating the Hessian at each iteration
of the maximization routine.
34APPENDIX 3
Table A.3. Estimation results for the benchmark model (spread term and
short rate in levels)

























35Table A.4. Estimation results for the benchmark model (spread term and
short rate in levels) by allowing time-varying transition probabilities





























Note: prob(st = i|st−1 = i,It) = exp[γ0(i)+γ1(i)(Rt−1 − rt−1)+
γ2(i)rt−1]/[1 + exp(γ0(i)+γ1(i)(Rt−1 − rt−1)+γ2(i)rt−1)],f o ri =1 , 2.
36Table A.5. Estimation results for the benchmark model (spread term
and ﬁrst-diﬀerences of the short rate) by allowing time-varying transition
probabilities





























Note: prob(st = i|st−1 = i,It) = exp[γ0(i)+γ1(i)(Rt−1−rt−1)+γ2(i)(rt−1−
rt−2)]/[1 + exp(γ0(i)+γ1(i)(Rt−1 − rt−1)+γ2(i)(rt−1 − rt−2))],f o ri =1 , 2.
37Table A.6. Summary of statistics of data
Short rate Spread Short rate Spread
Sample Period 1950:1-1992:7 1950:1-1992:7 1972:1-1992:7 1972:1-1992:7
Mean 5.0296 1.5188 7.1504 2.0920
Std. deviation 2.9625 1.3334 2.5939 1.6035
Skewness 0.9190 0.3194 1.0608 −0.5065
Kurtosis 0.8922 0.2231 1.1232 −0.1010
First autoc. 0.9711 0.8800 0.9288 0.8554
Second autoc. 0.9468 0.8075 0.8682 0.7717
Third autoc. 0.9257 0.7435 0.8122 0.6889
Cross-correl. −0.1497 −0.5977
Table A.7. Phillips-Perron Zρ tests
Period Variable With Trend Without Trend
Rt −6.27 −3.22
Sample rt −21.38 −11.76
1950:1-1992:7 ∆Rt −417.02 −417.05
∆rt −512.45 −512.69
Rt − rt −62.19 −50.82
Notes: The Phillips-Perron Zρ statistics are corrected for fourth-order serial
correlation. The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained when
considering Phillips-Perron Ztρ and augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, or when
considering alternative orders of the serial correlation correction in computing
Phillips-Perron statistics. For a sample size of 500 observations, the critical values
for the Phillips-Perron Zρ test are: with trend: 10%, -18.1; 5%, -21.5; 1%, -28.9;
without trend: 10%, -11.2; 5%, -14.0; 1%, -20.5. A table displaying the critical
values for the Phillips-Perron Zρ test is reported in Fuller (1976, p. 371).
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